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During the late 1980s and early 1990s, we identified a new phenomenon that we called ‘energy 
conflicts’ and showed that these conflicts were intimately linked to the differential profitability 
of the leading oil companies. Figure 1 below, which was first published in 1995, adds new data 
to bring this connection up to date.2  
The chart displays the differential return on equity of the ‘Petro-Core’, a group consisting of 
the world’s largest listed integrated oil companies. During early 1960s, the group included six 
firms – British Petroleum, Chevron, Exxon, Mobil, Royal-Dutch/Shell and Texaco. The 1999 
merger of Exxon and Mobil into ExxonMobil reduced this number to five, and the 2001 ab-
sorption of Texaco by Chevron truncated it to four (the current situation). 
Now, each bar in the chart shows the Petro-Core’s differential rate of return on equity. This 
differential is computed in two steps: first, by subtracting the return on equity of the Fortune 500 
group of companies from the return on equity of the Petro-Core; and second, by expressing the 
resulting difference as a per cent of the Fortune 500’s return on equity. Positive readings (grey 
bars) indicate differential accumulation: they measure the extent to which the Petro-Core beats 
the Fortune 500 average; negative readings (black bars) show differential decumulation: they tell 
us by how much the Petro-Core trails this average. 
Differential decumulation creates a ‘danger zone’ – i.e., a high likelihood of a new energy 
conflict erupting in the Middle East. The actual breakout of a conflict is marked by an explosion 
sign. The individual conflicts are listed in the note underneath the chart.  
 
The Stylized Patterns 
 
The figure shows three stylized patterns that have remained practically unchanged for the past 
half-century.  
First, and most importantly, every energy conflict save one was preceded by the Petro-Core 
trailing the average. In other words, for a Middle East energy conflict to erupt, the leading oil 
companies first have to differentially decumulate.3 The only exception to this rule is the 2011 
                                                 
1 Shimshon Bichler teaches political economy at colleges and universities in Israel. Jonathan Nitzan 
teaches political economy at York University in Canada. All of their publications are available for free 
on The Bichler & Nitzan Archives (http://bnarchives.net). Research for this paper was partly supported by 
the SSHRC.  
2 The figure appeared in Nitzan and Bichler (1995: 499). 
3 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, and again during the 2000s, differential decumulation was some-
times followed by a string of conflicts stretching over several years. In these instances, the result was a 
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burst of the ‘Arab Spring’ and the subsequent blooming of ‘outsourced wars’ (our term for the 
ongoing fighting in Lebanon-Syria-Iraq, which is financed and supported by a multitude of gov-
ernments and organizations in and outside the region). This round erupted without prior differ-
ential deccumulation – although the Petro-Core was very close to falling below the average. In 
2010, its differential return on equity dropped to a mere 3.3 per cent, down from 71.5 per cent in 
2009 and a whopping 1,114 per cent in 2008.  
 
Figure 1 
Differential Profits and Energy Conflicts: 

























* Return on equity is the ratio of net profit to owners’ equity. Differential re-
turn on equity is the difference between the return on equity of the Petro-Core 
and of the Fortune 500, expressed as a per cent of the return on equity of the 
Fortune 500. For 1992-93, data for Fortune 500 companies are reported without 
SFAS 106 special charges. The last data point is for 2013. 
 
NOTE: The Petro-Core consists of British Petroleum (BP-Amoco since 1998), 
Chevron (with Texaco since 2001), Exxon (ExxonMobil since 1999), Mobil 
(till 1998), Royal-Dutch/Shell and Texaco (till 2000). Company changes are 
due to mergers. Energy Conflicts mark the starting points of: the 1967 Ar-
ab-Israel war; the 1973 Arab-Israel war; the 1979 Iranian Revolution; the 1979 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the 1980 Iran-Iraq War; the 1982 second Is-
raeli invasion of Lebanon; the 1990-91 first Gulf War; the 2000 second Pales-
tinian Intifada; the 2001 attack of 9/11, the launching of the ‘War on Terror’ 
and the invasion of Afghanistan; the 2002-3 second Gulf War; the 2011 Arab 
Spring and outsourced wars; the 2014 third Gulf War.  
 
SOURCE: Fortune; Compustat through WRDS. 
                                                                                                                                     
longer time lag between the initial spell of differential decumulation and some of the subsequent con-
flicts. 
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Second, every energy conflict was followed by the oil companies beating the average. In 
other words, war and conflict in the region – processes that are customarily blamed for rattling, 
distorting and undermining the aggregate economy – have served the differential interest of the 
large oil companies at the expense of leading non-oil firms.4  
Third and finally, with one exception, in 1996-97, the Petro-Core never managed to beat 
the average without there first being an energy conflict in the region.5 In other words, the differ-
ential performance of the oil companies depended not on production, but on the most extreme 
form of sabotage: war.6 
 
The Universal Logic 
 
These stylized patterns appear almost too simple, not to say simplistic – particularly when com-
pared to sophisticated explanations of Middle East wars. And maybe this is their beauty. 
The experts on this subject – whether conservative or radical, Marxist or postist, materialist 
or culturalist, international relationsist or regional punditist – are undoubtedly right. The Mid-
dle East defies any simple logic – or at least that’s what the rulers want us to think. No deter-
minism can account for its cultural subtleties, no structural theory can explain its multilayered 
conflicts, no Eurocentric text can decipher its poststructural discourses. 
And yet, somehow, this kaleidoscope of complex specificities gets enfolded into the univer-
sal logic of modern capitalism: the differential accumulation of capital. In the Middle East, we 
have argued, this process revolves around oil profits:  
 
Obviously, the flow of arms to the region [and its associated conflicts] is anchored not 
in one particular cause but in the convergence of many: internal tensions [such as those 
leading to the Arab Spring], inter-state confrontations [for example, the 1980-88 
Iraq-Iran War], conflicts between coalitions of countries [the first, second and third 
Gulf Wars], superpower intervention [a permanent feature], radical and anti-radical 
ideologies [the 1979 Iranian revolution, ISIS, etc.], nationalism [the Palestinian intifa-
das], clericalism [Iran, Egypt, Afghanistan, etc.], economic turbulence and business cy-
cles [the unsatiated capitalist thirst for ‘cheap energy’]. . . . Yet, one way or another, 
these processes can be seen as already engulfed by and absorbed into the massive flow 
of the biggest prize of all: oil profits (Nitzan and Bichler 2007: 376, translated from the 
Hebrew). 
 
Our analysis of this process has focused on what we called the ‘Weapondollar-Petrodollar 
Coalition’ – a formidable albeit tenuous alliance between the largest armament contractors, the 
integrated oil companies, OPEC and various branches of western governments:  
 
                                                 
4 It is important to note here that the energy conflicts have led not to higher oil profits as such, but to high-
er differential oil profits. For example, in 1969-70, 1975, 1980-82, 1985, 1991, 2001-2, 2006-7, 2009 and 
2012, the rate of return on equity of the Petro-Core actually fell; but in all cases the fall was either slower 
than that of the Fortune 500 or too small to close the positive gap between them, so despite the decline, the 
Petro-Core continued to beat the average. 
5 Although there was no official conflict in 1996-97, there was plenty of violence, including an Iraqi 
invasion of Kurdish areas and U.S. cruise missile attacks (‘Operation Desert Strike’). 
6 For the details underlying the individual energy conflicts, as well as a broader discussion of the entire 
process, see Bichler and Nitzan (1996), Nitzan and Bichler (2002: Ch. 5), Bichler and Nitzan (2004) and 
Nitzan and Bichler (2006). 
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The large oil companies and the leading arms makers both gained from Middle East 
‘energy conflicts’ – the first through higher conflict premiums and the latter via larger 
military orders. But beyond this common interest the position of these groups differed 
in certain important respects. . . . Overall, ‘energy conflicts’ tended to boost arms ex-
ports both in the short-run and long-run, and given that the weapon makers have had 
an open-ended interest in such sales . . . their support for these conflicts should have 
been more or less unqualified. For the Petro-Core, however, the calculations are prob-
ably more subtle. . . . [T]he effects on their profits of higher war-premiums would be 
positive only up to a certain point. Furthermore, the outcome of regional conflicts is 
not entirely predictable and carries the inherent danger of undermining their intricate 
relations with host governments. For these reasons, we should expect the large oil 
companies to have a more qualified view on the desirability of open Middle-East hos-
tilities. Specifically, as long as their financial performance is deemed satisfactory, the 
Petro-Core members would prefer the status quo of tension-without-war. When their 
profits wither, however, the companies’ outlook is bound to become more hawkish, 
seeking to boost income via a conflict-driven ‘energy crisis’ (Nitzan and Bichler 1995: 
497). 
 
Unfortunately for most subjects of the Middle East – and for the vast majority of the world 
population – the empirical regularities of energy conflicts and differential profits we have teased 




Looking backward, these regularities helped us explain the history of the process till the late 
1980s. Looking forward, they allowed us to predict, in writing and before the event, the 
1990-91 first Gulf War as well as the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2002 onset of the 
second Gulf War.7  
We have not predicted the recent spate of energy conflicts – but only because our research 
over the past decade has carried us away from the Middle East. The logic of our argument, 
though, remains intact. As Figure 1 shows, any researcher who would have updated our data 
could have predicted, ahead of time, the 2011 Arab Spring and its associated outsourced wars, 
as well as the 2014 third Gulf War against ISIS.  
Of course, our Middle East story here is largely a fable, a way of making a bigger point. 
The region’s dramas – its conflicts and wars, its oil crises and inflicted scarcities, OPEC’s mach-
inations and outside interventions, terrorism and nationalism, religion and culture – all have 
their own specific logic, or ‘narrative’. But the world we live in is dominated by capital, and the 
very essence capital is to harness, internalize and subjugate each and every power process, so 
that they all end up marching to its own universal drum beat: the differential accumulation of 
dominant capital. 
Q E D. 
 
  
                                                 
7 See Bichler, Rowley and Nitzan (1989: Section 2.3) for a prediction of the first conflict and Bichler and 
Nitzan (1996: Section 8) for a prediction of the second. 
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